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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code 78-2-2- (H).
Appellant moves that this Court consider his petition and
relief.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Due process of law
2. Ineffective Counsel
3. Jurisdiction
k. Equal protection

1

NATUxRE OF CASE
Appellant, George W. Elwood is an inmate at the Utah State Prison.
Appellant plead guilty to the charges of sexual abuse of a child,
(2 counts), and was sentenced to two concurrent terms of an indeterminate sentence of 1-15 years each.
The Honorable Judge Venoy Christoffersen, of the 1st Judicial
District, County of Cache, State of Utah presided at both trial and
sentencing.
During this time the Cache County Attorney was Lanny Franklin
Gunnell, who is now a 1st District Judge.
The Deputy County Attorney who prosecuted the case James C. Jenkins
who in concert with Mr. Gunnell purported to have the legal authority
required by law to prosecute the Appellant.
Appellant was sentenced on May 21, 1987 and committed to the Utah
State j^rison on May 22, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 25, 1989, former Federal Judge and Professor of law, David
R. Daines filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court Case No.
87-NC-G8IW, wherein he had discovered that neither Gunnell or Jenkins
were properly legally seated in their respective posititions.
Both Gunnell and Jenkins were never properly constituted in that
they had not been properly appointed in writing, sworn into office nor
had the appropriate documents been filed to validate their authority
prior to the time Appellant had been arrested, tried and sentenced.
Specifically, the Appellant alleges that L. F. Gunnell was elected
Cache County Attorney on January I, 1979 and was re-elected in 1983
and 1987.
It is further alleged that Mr. Gunnell never filed the report
owed for the I979-I9S2, nor did he file a written oath or a per se
letter to terminate 1983-86, and only in 1987 did Mr Gunnell file the
proper oath.
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Mr, Jenkins was not appointed nor did he file the required oath
as Deputy County Attorney for 1983 or 1987 terms.
Based on these facts a petition was filed in the Third Judicial
District which now has jurisdiction of Appellant.
The petition was dismissed without a hearing on September 21f 1989.

3,

SUMMAfff OF ARGUMENT
The Appellant has the Constitutional light to be prosecuted by
individuals who have been properly appointed and oathed, and those
appointments and oaths properly filed for public record.
When the binding of oath to support the United States and State of
Utah Constitutions failed to occur, these legal deficiencies present
themselves.
1.

The 1st District Judicial Court, County of Cache failed to

constitute proper jurisdiction. That Court at the time of arrest
prosceution and sentencing was legally and lawfully deficient to acquire
proper jurisdiction of Appellant Elwood due to the deficiencies of both
the prosecuting Attorney and his Deputy, Documents they initialed were
invalid.
2.

Constititional protections guarantees like treatment of all

those similarly situated. When the violations of both Utah Codes and
the Constitutions of both the State of Utah and the U.S. Constitution
occured, Appellant Elwood was denied equal protection under the law.
3.

Constitutional protections of Due Jrrocess of Law couldn't be

more evident. Appellant's rights to due process were both impaired and
denigrated.
The officials who prosecuted Appellant could not legally prosecute
persons arrested and facing criminal charges. All such action are null
and void.
The resulting form of local govcrance from which Appellants
incarceration arose was a de facto system outside the rule of law.
That system that prosecuted Appellant was not within judicially interpreted Constitutional principles.
The entire Cache County system was an infringement of criminal
laws, self serving acts by officials at the expense of it's citizens.
Logan Attorney, Robert Gutke, who defended Appellant, in his
defense of Steven Ray James requested a new trial for James because the
Deputy County Attorney of Cache County had not filed his required oath
of office. He stated that the Deputy Prosecutor could not legally
prosecute his client.

4

If Mr James could not legally be prosected by those prosecutors
then neither toof could they prosecute Appellant Elwood.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT I Jurisdiction
Utah Code Ann, § I7-I6-7 (supp. 1989) states:
"Until the appointment of a Deputy
is made in writting and an oath taken,
a deputy is not a Deputy1.1
Jurisdictional Deficiency could not be more clear.
They had not the legal authority to proceed.
POINT II Equal protection as provided under the I^-th Amendement were
denied Appellant. Under Section I. of the I^th Amendment it states:
"nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the law?
POINT III

Due process of law
Article VI of the Constitution of the United States says
that:
"Judicial officers, both of the
United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by oath or
affirmation, to support this constitution"
Article IV Section 10, of the Utah Constitution also requires
a legal appointment in writing, an oath and proper filing.
Utah Criminal Code 76-8-203 says;
" A person is guilty of unofficial
misconduct if he excuses or attempts
to exercise any of the function of a
public office when:
(A.) He has not taken and filed
the required oath of office: or
(c) He has not been elected or
appointed to office.
63 A Am Jur 2d from Public Officers and Employees S 130 states:
"A public officer who at the end
of his term or office is again
chosen for the office must generally
qualify for his new term by furnishing
the required bond, taking an oath of
office or preforming whatever other
acts may be necessary to qualify him for
the same position?

6

AT § 131.
"the prescribed oath of office may
be enacted of every public officer,
whether Federal, State, County or
Municipal?
See: Bond V Floyd 385 U.S. Il6, 17 L ED 2d 235, 87 S. GT
339 also, see Oklahoma City V Oklahoma R. Co. 20 Okla. I,
93 P ^8.
Court stated that the Federal (or State) judisiary would be justified
in testing the exclusion by federal constitution standards.
In Gomillion V Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (i960) the court
stated:
"When a state exercises power wholly
within the domain of state interest,
it is insulated from federal judicial
review, But, such insulation is not
carried over when state power is used
as an instrument for circumventing a
federally protected right'.'
364 U.S. at 347.
In Bond V Floyd, the state on page 130 and 131 further states:
"There can be no doubt as to the
constitutionality of the quaification
involved in this case because it is
imposed on the state legislators by
Article VI of the United States constitution? and moreover;
"the state contends that no decision
of this court suggests that a state
may not ensure the loyalty of it's
public servants by making the taking
of an oath a qualification of office?
From the Federalist, No. 60, P. *K)9 (Cooke ed. I96l) on page 136 it says:
"the qualification of the person who
may choose to be choosen—are defined
and fixed by the constitution; and are
UNALTERABLE by the legislature?
In addition both judges Bell and Morgan writing for the majority of the
court reasoned that; "separation-of-powers principals gave the legislature
power to insist on qualifications in addition to those specified in
the state constitution?
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In Oklahoma City V. Oklahoma B. Co. t (Supreme Court of Oklahoma
1907) it wrote:
,§
It was obvious intention of the
constitution, not only to prohibit
public officers of the state from receiving from corporations privileges of
favors that might improperly influence
them in the discharge of their duties,
but also that the general public should
have equal facilities and conveniences of
transportation without discrimination in
the charge therefor?
And Section I of Article 15 of the Constitution reads as follows:
" Senators and all Representatives, and
all judicial, State and County Officers,
shall, before entering upon the duties of
their respective offices, take and subscribe
to the following oath or affirmation-etc?
In

Dayton V. Swapp, D. C. Utah *±8k F. Supp. 958 above which
noted:
"Implicit in concept of due process are
ideas that government must follow it's
own rules and that it must do so within
reasonable time?
The compulsory nondiscretionary nature of the souereign's
duty to follow it's own rules is highlighted by a continuation
of the same C. J. S. citation at page 266.
"and where a state has established proceedure
which comports with due process, state and
local officials are bound to follow those
procedures.
(citing Wolf V. Lillie V. Kenosha County Sheriff, D. C. Wis., 5#f
The local Cache County prosecutorial and judicial "Discresionary
compliance is dispelled with the case of Deseret Savings Bank
V. Francis, 62 Utah 85, 217 P. II3A (1923). Qjioting from
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Supervisors V, UJ3.4 wall ^35, 18 L. ED. *H9:
"The conclusion to be deduced from the
authorities is that, where power is given
to public officers, in the language of
the act before us, or in equivalent language,
whenever the public interest or individual
rights call for it's exercise, the language,
though permissive in form, is in fact preeraatory. What they are empowered to do for
a third person, the law requires shall be
done. The power is given, not for their
benefit, but for his. It is placed with the
depository to meet the demands of right,
and to prevent a failure of Justice. It is
given as a remedy to those entitled to invoke
it's aid, and who would be otherwise remediless .
"In all such cases it is held that the intent, which is the test, was not to devolve
a mere discretion, but to impose a positive
and absolute duty?
The following quotation from G. J. S. establishes clearly that
compliance is required by due process:
"In criminal matters, due process requirements
must be rightfully adhered to. Whether defendant's constitutional right to due process
of law has been infringed in a criminal prosecution will be determined on the particular
facts of each case, but any substajitual doubt
as to a possible deprivation of due process of
law must be resolved in favor of the defendant?
16 G C. J. S. Con. Law Sec. 99 Z K&. 350 &35I
" The more serious the deprivation (arrest,
imprisonment ) the more extensive the procedural
safeguards which must precede it's imposition,
so the extent to which procedural due process
must be afforded a person is influenced by the
extent to which a person may be condemned to
suffer a grievous loss?
(16 C-C. J. S. Con law Sec. 967 PG 2^8)
"The due process clauses require that a power
conferred by law be exercised judiciously with
an honest intent to fulfill the purpose of law,
and it is a judicial function to see that the
requirement is met?
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(16 C C.T.S. Low Law Sec. 967 PO Zfy)
James Jenkins who prosecuted Appellant Elwood as a Deputy County
Attorney, at every stage was a De Facto imposter. He was not appointed
in writing and did not file the required Oath of Office. The Court
never acquired jurisdiction, the Court thus deprived Appellant of Due
Process.
This is a jurisdictional defect of the highest order, under
Section 77-35-5 (b) U.C.A. 1953 and the following Utah Cases: State
V. Freeman, (1937) 93 U.I25, 71 P. 2d 196 1 State V. Merritt (T925J

67 Utah 355Utah Constitution, Article IV Sec 10 clearly requires the before
entering upon their duties, Deputy County Attorneys as county officers
must "file the prescribed Oath of Office.ALL ACTS of defacto officials
taken before they file the oaths are unofficial misconduct, under Utah
Code Sec 52- 2-1 U.C.A. 1953The statute also requires that he be appointed by L.F. Gunnell
in writing, he never was.
In Page V. McAfee, 487 -P. 2d 861 (UT 1971) these facts must
be determinative:
"Under our Statute, to become a Deputy,
three facts were absolutely necessary:
1. His appointment must have been made in
writing, which was not done.
2. Such written appointment must have
been filed in the office of the County
Clerk, which was not done.
3. He was required to take the Oath which
was not done.
The same Statute, in the same para in clear language says:
"Until such appointment is so made and
filed and until such deputy shall have
taken the Oath of Office, no one shall
be or act as such deputy?
Judge Ellett illuminates all fours appliciation of Page to
case at bar by concluding;
"Simply because an acting Deputy County
Attorney had not taken the written Oath
when he had prosecuted Criminal Cases
under the direction of the duly qualified
County Attorney for eight years, the trial
is a nullity.
Even if Arguendo, he was qualified in 1981, he had to requalify
for Gunnell*s subsequent terms. See 63 A. Am Jur 2d. public officers
and employees, Sec 129.
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Appellant Elwood's claim is in accord with the Attorney General,
State of Utah's opinion No. 32-115 dated February 23, 1984. (Slip
opinion is in Appellants Exhibits attached to his petition,)
In particular please note on the last page (015OK) subsection
3 of para (5) which states:
"Legal authority showing Appellant's
conviction should be reversed if in
fact said Attorneys had not taken the
Oath1.1
Utah Code Section I7-I6-8 U. C, A. 1953 reads:
"Whenever the official name of any
principal officer is used in any law
conferming powers or imposing duties
or liabilities it includes deputies?
The law states in 43 Am. Jur, public officers, Section 469, to be:
"Adeputy may be an officer de facto
and not de jure, for failing to qualify,
as by failing to take the qualifying
Oath and Oath of office, without invalidating his official acts as to third
person1?
DUE PROCESS OF LAW IS AI£0 PROVIDED APPELLANT UNDER THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE I. SECTION 7.
POINT IV Ineffective Counsel
In Bundy V, Deland, 94 Utah Adr. Rep 9 (Sup. Ct 10/26/88)
the Court stated that:
Habeas Corpus proceedings may be used
to attack a judgement or conviction in
the event of an obvious injustice or a
substantual and prejudical denial of a
Constitutional right in the trial of
the matter; However, it cannot be used
for regular appellate review.
Since no appeal was filed by Counsel this claim is proper,
In State V, Gibbons, ?04 P. 2d 1309 (Utah I987)it
states:
"The trial court has the burden of ensuring
that constitutional and rule requirements of
due process are complied with when a guilty
plea is entered.

II

Appellant's attorney led him to believe that an incarceration
of approximately 12 months would be the outcome of his plea, and
in para (C.) it states:
"Due process was violated where the
taking of a guilty plea did not comport
with the requirements of Rule II (e)
in that the defendant was not informed
of the elements of the crimes charged
agaist him.
Appellant has been incarcerated since May 22, 1987, the Board
Pardons at his original hearing required a re-hearing in four years,
the current policies of the Board of Pardon requires similarily
situated offender to an incarceration time of approximately 6 years.
Counsel's advise was incorrect and misleading. The reality of
Appellants incarceration will be 5 times what he believed would be
the outcome of his plea.
In
Summers V. Cook, 87 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (ct app.88) it states:
"Habeas Corpus review appropriate where
the petitioner has shown good cause why
a direct appeal from the denial of his
plea of guilt was not made.
Appellant had no idea what the Board of Pardons would require
until 8 months after his incarceration. At that time a direct appeal
was untimely.
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CONCLUSION

The prosecutional process in this case in employing the full
power of the State of Utah against Appellant Elwood evinces an array
of breaches of the States own Constitutional and statutory rules.
The breach by it's own officers is the clearest form of due process
infringement.
WHEREFORE it is the prayer of Appellant Elwood that his trial
be declared null and void and that he be remanded to Cache County
that he be given a legal and lawful outcome of any and all charges
that he is required to defend himself against in the future.

Dated this / #
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I. Attorney General, State of Utah
236 Utah State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84-11^

Plaintiff/Appellant

day of
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CONSTITUTION OK THE UNITED STATES

ART.

VII

made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme
Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial
Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be
bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no
religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or
public Trust under the United States.
ARTICLE VII
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States ratifying
the Same. Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the states
present the seventeenth day of September in the year of our Lord one
thousand seven hundred and eighty seven and of the independence of
the United States of America the twelfth. In Witness Whereof we have
hereunto subscribed our names,
Attest:

Go. WASHINGTON—Presidt.

WILLIAM JACKSON,

Secretary

New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Connecticut
New York

and deputy from Virginia

{

JOHN LANGDON,
NICHOLAS GILMAN.

f NATHANIEL GORHAM,
\ RUFUS KINO.
J WM. SAML. JOHNSON,
\ ROGER SlIKRMAN.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON.
W l L : lilVINGSTON,

New Jersey

DAVID BREARLEY,
WM. PATTERSON,
JONA: DAYTON.
f B

FRANKLIN,

THOMAS MIFFLIN,
ROUT MORRIS,

Pennsylvania

GEO. CLYMER,
TIIOS. FITZSIMONS,
JARED INGERSOLL,
JAMES WILSON,
GOUV MORRIS.
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0FT1CIAL OATHS AND BONDS

SHCUI*

ttu£

52-1-4

52-1-2. Bonds to state — Approval and recording — Filing
of oaths.
Whenever state officers, officials of state institutions, or other persons, are
required to give official bonds to the state, the bonds, unless otherwise provided, shall be approved by the Division of Finance, and recorded by the state
treasurer in a book kept for that purpose. The oaths of office of all state
officials shall be filed with the Division of Archives.

CHAPTER 2
FAILURE TO QUALIFY FOR OFFICE
'Section
62-2-1.

Tim* in which to qualify — Failure
— Office declared vacant

52-2-1. Time in which to qualify — Failure — Office declared vacant
Whenever any person duly elected or appointed to any office of the state or
any of its political subdivisions, fails to qualify for such office within sixty
days after the date of beginning of the term of office for which he was elected
or appointed, such office shall thereupon become vacant and shall befilledas
provided by law. Whenever the bond of any officer of the state or of any of its
political subdivisions is canceled, revoked, annulled or otherwise becomes
void or of no effect, without another proper bond being given so that continuance of bonded protection is afforded, the office of such officer shall there217

ABUSE OF OFFICE
Section
76-8-201.
76-8-202.
76-8*203.

Official misconduct — Unauthorized
acts or failure of duty.
Official misconduct — Unlawful acts
based on "inside** information.
Unofficial misconduct.

76-8-201. Official misconduct — Unauthorized
acta or failure of doty.
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor
if. with an intent to benefit himself or another or to
harm another, he knowingly eommits an unautho*
rized act which purports to be an act of his office, or
knowingly refrains from performing a duty imposed
on him by law or clearly inherent in the nature of his
office.
i m
76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct
(1) A person is guilty of unofficial misconduct if he
exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions
of a public office when:
(a) He has not taken and filed the required
oath of office; or
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or
(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has expired and the successor
has been elected or appointed and has qualified,
or after (iia office has been legally removed.
(e) He knowingly withholds or retainsfromhis
successor in office or other person entitled to the
official seal or any records, papers, documents, or
other writings appertaining or belonging to his
office or mutilates or destroys or takes away the
same.
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misde-

CONSTITUTION OP UTAH
hold over; he may resign. Tooele County v.
Pe La Mare, 90 U. 46, 59 P. 2d 1155, 106
A. L. R. 182, superseding !>0 U. 23, 3D 1\
2d 1051, and following State ex rcl. Stain
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, 35 P. 2d 775.
Indefinite term of office.
General rule that term for which officer
is elected shall ho fixed hefore election is
inapplicable where voters, at Maine election, vote on officer and also on proposed
constitutional amendment extending term

ART. V , § 1

of that office. Snow v. Keddington, 113 U.
325, 195 P. 2d 234.
Collateral References.
Beginning or expiration of term of clec«
tivo office where no time fixed by law, 80
A. L. B. 1290, 135 A. I* Ii. 1173.
Power of board to make appointment to
office or contract extending beyond its
owu term, 149 A. L. It. 336.
"Until" as word of inclusion or exclusion where term of office runs until a
specified day, 1C A. L. It. 1100.

Sec. 10. [Oath of office.]
All officers made elective or appointive by this Constitution or by the
laws made in pursuance thereof, before entering upon the duties of
their respective offices, shall take and subscribe the following oath or
affirmation: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support, obey
and defend the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution
of this State, and that I will discharge the duties of rny office with
fidelity, n
Compiler's Notes.
The quotation marks at the end of this
section have been carried in brackets in
all compilations sinco ltevised Statutes of
1898.

deputy county clerk (a person duly authorized to administer oaths) although he
did not go through some formal ritual,
with the raising of his right hand. State
v. Mathews, 13 U. (2d) 391, 375 P. 2d 392.

Comparable Prevision.
Montana Const., Art. XiX, § 1.

Supremo Court Justices required to take
oath.
Judges of the Supremo Court subscribe
to this oath when entering upon their
duties as justices thereof. Critchlow v.
Monson, 102 U. 378, 131 P. 2d 794. For
sequel to this case, see State ex rel. Jugler
v. Grover, 102 U. 459, 132 P. 2d 125.

Cross-Reference.
Oaths of officers, 52-1-1.
Bond required in addition to oath.
Statute requiring state treasurer to give
bond is not unconstitutional on ground
that legislature eould not add to requirement in this section. State ex reU Stain
v. Christensen, 84 U. 185, 35 P. 2d 775.

Collateral References.
Omcers®=>36(l).
67 C.J.S. Officers § 38.

Formal ritual unnecessary.
A deputy county recorder took the oath
of office, required by this section, by his
signing of oath form duly notarised by a

Member of grand or petit jury as officer
within constitutional or statutory provisions in relation to oath or affirmation,
118 A. L. R. 1098.

ARTICLE V
DISTRIBUTION OF P O W E R S
Section.
1. [Three departments of government.]

Section 1. [Three departments of government.]
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided
into three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the
Judicial; and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions
199

63A Am Jur 2d

PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES

§ 129

sickness or the weather. 52 T h e authorities generally hold that in case of a
contest, it is not necessary to qualify until the question of title is determined. 53
If a statute fixes the time within which an elected officer must qualify, the
officer may, in anticipation of his induction into the office, take and execute
his official oath and bond, and deposit them with the proper authority prior to
that time; but such acts do not operate or become effective as a qualification
until after the time when the law provides that he must qualify.54
^C§ 129. Official bond.
Most public officers are required to give a bond for the performance of their
official duties, 55 even when re-elected or reappointed to succeed themselves. 58
A periodical renewal of the bond is sometimes required of particular officers,57
and where the circumstances warrant it, a new bond may be called for.58
As a rule, an officer does not acquire a legal standing until the required
bond is given,59 although he may be regarded as an officer de facto.60 It may
even be made a misdemeanor for an officer to act in his official capacity
without having first executed and filed the requisite bond. 61 If a bond is
required to be filed, a tender may be a sufficient compliance with the statutory
requirement, especially where those authorized to approve the bond decline to
act on the ground that the officer is not qualified to hold the office.62
The time within which the officer must give the required bond 63 and the
manner of taking it64 are usually prescribed. T h e statute may expressly or by
implication make the filing of the required bond within the time allowed for
such purpose mandatory, 65 and compliance with it a condition precedent to the
right to take the ofiice, so that the right is lost by a failure to perform the
condition within the time limited. 66 It may be said, however, that official bonds
arc intended for the benefit of the public, 67 and that requirements of the law
as to the time of filing them should not be taken as mandatory unless clearly
52. Brown v Tama Countv, 122 Iowa 745, 98
XW 562.
53. Kreitz v Behrensmever, 149 111 496, 36 NE
9S3; Murdoch v Strange', 99 Md 89, 57 A 62S;
State ex rel. Barham v Graham, 161 Tenn 557,
30 SW'2d 274; Rasmussen v Board of Com'rs, 8
Wyo 277, 56 P 1098.
54. Ballantvne v Bower, 17 Wyo 356, 99 P
S69.

56. § 130.
57. Bullock v State, 65 NJL 557, 47 A 62.
58. Broome v United States, 56 US 143, 14 L
Ed 636.
59. Broome v United States, 56 US 143, 14 L
Ed 636.
60. § 594.
6 1 . Brown v Tama Countv, 122 Iowa 745, 98
NW 562.

55. Soule v United States. 100 US 8, 25 L Ed
536; Broome v United States, 56 US 143, 14 L
Ed 636; Farrar v United States, 30 US 373, 8 L
Ed 159; United States v Kirkpatrick, 22 US
720, 6 L Ed 199; American Surety Co. v Independent School Dist. No. 18 (CA8 Minn) 53
E2d 178. SI ALR I, cert den 284 US 683, 76 L
Ed 577, 52 S Ct 200; Deatsch v Fairfield, 27
Ariz 387. 233 P 887, 38 ALR 651; Kansas
Amusement Co. v Eddv, 143 Kan 988, 57 P2d
458, 105 ALR 702; Countv Com'rs of Calvert
Countv v Monnett, 164 Md 101, 164 A 155, 86
ALR 125S; Lawrence v American Suretv Co.,
263 Mich 586, 249 NW 3, 88 ALR 535; reh
den 264 Mich 516, 250 NW 295, 88 ALR 546.

66. State ex rel. Berge v Lansing, 46 Neb 514,
64 NW 1104.

For a discussion o( the form and sufficiency
of official bonds and liability on such bonds,
see §§ 487 et seq.

67. Clavev v United States, 182 US 595, 45 L
Ed 1247, 21 S Ct 891; United States v Bradlev.
35 US 343, 9 L Ed 448.

62. Schmulbach v Speidel, 50 W Va 553, 40
SE424.
63. Broome v United States. 56 US 143, 14 L
Ed 636; Countv Com'rs of Calvert Countv v
Monnett. 164 Md 101. 164 A 155, 86 ALR
1258.
64. Broome v United States. 56 US 143, 14 L
Ed 636.
65. Stale ex rel. Beige v Lansing, 46 Neb 514,
64 NW 1104.
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so. In numerous cases they have been construed as merely directory. 68 Thus, a
statute providing that an office will become vacant on failure to furnish a bond
within a specified time has been held to be only directory. 69 Where the
provision is only directory, noncompliance with it does not result in a
forfeiture of the right to the office,70 but it will justify the authorities in
refusing to accept and approve the bond. 71
Sickness or other matters that excuse delay on the part of an officer in
taking steps to qualify for the office72 will justify delay in filing his bond. 73
§ 130. Requalifying on re-election, reappointment, or holding over.
A public officer who at the end of his term of office is again chosen for the
office must generally qualify for his new term by furnishing the required bond,
taking an oath of office, "or performing whatever other acts may be necessary
to qualify him for the position, 74 and his failure to do so is accompanied by the
same consequences as in the case of an original election or appointment. 75
Certain officers may be required by statute to renew their official bond at
stated periods during their term of office.76 An officer holding over until his
successor is chosen does so by virtue of his previous appointment, election,
and qualification, and unless some provision of the law so requires, he need
not requalify.77
§ 131. Oath or affirmation.
Before beginning his official duties, a public officer may be required by
constitutional or statutory provisions to take an oath 78 or make affirmation.79
But the taking of an official oath does not per se make the position an office.80
The prescribed oath of office may be exacted of every public officer,
whether federal,81 state, 82 county, 83 or municipal. 84 It is customary to require
68. United States v Eaton, 169 US 331, 42 L
Ed 767, IS S Ct 374; United States v Bradlev,
35 US 343, 9 L Ed 44S.
69. § 142.

164 Miss 405, H 5 So 505. 86 ALR 290; State
ex rel. Barney v H a u k i n s , 79 Mont 506. 257 P
411, 53 ALR 583; McCue \ AntiselL 105 NJ
^Super 128, ^31 A2d SQS.

Practice Aids.—Form
drafting guide—official
70. Commissioners of Knox Countv v Johnoath. 15 A M J U R LEGAL FORMS 2d, PUBLIC
son, 124 Ind 145. 24 NE 148; State ex rel. OFFICERS § 213:61.
Dithmar v Bunnell, 131 Wis 198, 110 N\V 177.

Oath of office. 15 AM JUR LEGAL FORMS 2d,

71. §501.
72. § 12S.
73. Kreitz v Behrensmeser, 149 111 496. 36 NE
9S3; Murdoch \ Strange,'99 Md 89, 57 A 62S.

PUBLIC OFFICERS §213:62.

Oath or affirmation of public emplovee. 15
AM J U R LEGAL FORMS 2d, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES

§210:26.

79. People ex rel. German Ins. Co. v Williams,
145 111573,33 NE 849.
74. Walker \ Hughes (Sup) 42 Del 447, 36
A2d 47, 151 ALR 946; Roue v Tuck. 149 Ga
Practice Aids.—Affirmation
of office. 15 AM
83. 99 SE 303, 5 ALR 113.
JUR

75. Bullock \ State, 65 NJL 557, 47 A 62.
76. § 129.
77. Baker Citv v Murph\. 30 O r 405. 42 P
133.

LEGAL

FORMS

2d,

PUBLIC

OFFICERS

§213:64.
80. § 4.
SI. I'S Const. Art VI. cl 3.
As to the oath required of and administered
to federal officers and emplo\ees, see 5 USCS
§§2903-2906. 3331.

78. L\ons \ Woods, 153 VS 649. 3$ 7 7 E d
854. 14 S Ct 959; Parker v Overman. 59 US
137, 15 L Ed 318; American Suretv Co. v
82. Bond v Flovd. 385 US 116, 17 L Ed 2d
Independent School Dist. No. 18 (CAS Minn)
2 3 5 , 8 7 S C t 339.
53 F2d ITS. 81 ALR 1. cert den 284 US 683,
76 L Ed'577. 52 S Ct 200; Adams v State, 214
83. Oklahoma Cit\ \ Oklahoma R. Co., 20
Ind COa* 17 NE2d 84. 118 ALR 1095; June v
Okla 1,93 P 4 8 .
School Dist.. 283 Mich 533, 278 N\V 676. 116
ALR 581; State ex re!. Mitchell v McDonald.
84. Frans v Young. 30 Neb 360, 46 N'W 528.
7A9
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76-8-109. Failure of member of legislature to disclose interest in measure or bill.—Every member of the legislature who has a personal or private
interest in any measure or bill proposed or pending before the legislature of
which he is a member and does not disclose the fact to the house of which
he is a member and votes thereon is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-109, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-109.

Part 2
Abuse of Office
76-8-201. Official misconduct—Unauthorized acts or failure of duty.—
A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, with an intent to
benefit himself or another or to harm another, he knowingly commits an
unauthorized act which purports to be an act of his office, or knowingly
refrains from performing a duty imposed on him by law or clearly inherent
in the nature of his office.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-201, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-201.
Cross-Keferences.
Penalty for receiving illegal fees, 21-713 to 21-7-15.

Collateral References.
Officers€=121.
^ C.J.S. Officers § 133.
C3 A m
- J u r - 2<* 837> Public Officers and
Employees § 346.

76-8-202. Official misconduct—Unlawful acts based on "inside" information.—A public servant is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, knowing
that official action is contemplated or in reliance on information which he
has acquired by virtue of his office or from another public servant, which
information'has not been made public, he:
(1) Acquires or divests himself of a pecuniary interest in any property, transaction, or enterprise which may be affected by such action or information ; or
(2) Speculates or wagers on the basis of such action or information; or
(3) Knowingly aids another to do any of the foregoing.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-202, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-202.

Collateral References.
OfficersC=121.
07 C.J.S. Officers § 133.
03 Am. Jur. 2d S37, Public Officers and
Employees § 346.

76-8-203. Unofficial misconduct.—(1) A person is guilty of unofficial
misconduct if he exercises or attempts to exercise any of the functions of a
public office when:
(a) He has not taken and filed the required oath of office; or
(b) He has failed to execute and file the required bond; or
(c) He has not been elected or appointed to office; or
172
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(d) He exercises any of the functions of his office after his term has
expired and the successor has been elected or appointed and has qualified,
or after his office has been legally removed.
(e) He knowingly withholds or retains from his successor in office or
other person entitled to the official seal or any records, papers, documents,
or other writings appertaining or belonging to his office or mutilates or
destroys or takes away the same,
(2) Unofficial misconduct is a class B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-203, enacted by
L. 1373, ch. 196, § 76-8-203.

Constitutionality of statute requiring, or
limiting, selection or appointment of public officers or agents from members of a
political party or parties, 170 A. L. R. 198.
Time as of which eligibility or ineligibility to office is to be determined, 143
A. L. R. 1026.

Collateral References.
OffkersG=>121.
67 C.J.S. Officers § 133.
63 Am. Jur. 2d 837, Public Officers and
Employees § 346.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Mandamus of de facto officers.
Mandamus could issue against de facto
drainage district officers who had not
made oath and filed bond required by stat-

ute to compel them to perform duties they
already voluntarily assumed to do.
Colorado Development Co. v. Creer, 96 U.
h ^ P» 2d 914.

ha<i

Part 3
Obstructing Governmental Operations
76-8-301. Interference with public servant.—A person is guilty of a
class B misdemeanor if he uses force, violence, intimidation, or engages in
any other unlawful act with a purpose to interfere with a public servant
performing or purporting to perform an official function.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-301, enacted by
L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-8-301.

5S Am. Jur. 2d S62, Obstructing Justice
§ 10.

Collateral References.
Obstructing Justice€=2.
67 C.J.S. Obstructing Justice § 1.

Criminal liability for obstructing process as affected by invalidity or irregularity of the process, 10 A. L . ' R . 3d 1146.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Elements of offense.
ficer
To make out offense it must have appeared that (a) duly constituted public
officer, (b) engaged in performance of offieial duty, (c) had been obstructed or resisted by defendant. State v. Sandman, 4
U. (2d) 69, 2S6 P. 2d 1060.
University security officer who arrested
student in area where sole interests of university were location of fraternity and
religious institute for students was not
discharging, or attempting to discharge,
any dutv of his office, and subsequent interference with arrest by fellow student
was not resistance or obstruction of of-

e s t of

in discharge of duty. State in InterHurley, 2S U. (2d) 248, 501 P. 2d

m*
Employer who refused to bring employee out of factory so that deputy sheriff
could serve her with small claims court
order was not obstructing officer in performing his duty where employer had no
objections to service during various work
breaks, including coffee, but not during
working hours, since particular manufachiring process became dangerous if work
were impeded. State v. Ludlow, 2S U. (2d)
434, 503 P. 2d 1210.
to
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the purpose of an appeal from the judgment
thereon."' While this is true, it does not
follow t h a t one who is neither a necessary
nor a proper p a r t y to the action must be
considered adverse merely because he appears as such upon the record. Having parted with his title to the fund by his assignment to the plaintiff, as he admits, Frankovich w a s not a necessary or proper party, because he had no interest in the action. His
presence as a party, therefore, was no more
appropriate t h a n t h a t of any other stranger.
No relief w a s demanded against him, nor did
he demand any. Nor could he have any interest in the result of the appeal. The justice might have dismissed t h e action as to
him of his own motion. This would not have
affected him in t h e least. Under such circumstances, he was not an adverse party,
and it was not incumbent upon plaintiff to
t r e a t him as such. T h e motion to dismiss
the appeal w a s properly denied.
I t is said t h a t the court should have sustained P a r i s Bros.' demurrer. I n this contention there is no merit. T h e justice sustained the demurrer, and practically dismissed these defendants out of the' case.
This was upon the theory, presumably, t h a t
he would not entertain t h e action as brought
and g r a n t the relief demanded against them.
It h a d accomplished its purpose. When the
order of substitution w a s made, the objection
was not urged t h a t the complaint did not
tender an issue upon the question of right
between them and t h e plaintiff. The district
court should have disregarded it, as it virtually did by overruling it.
The court overruled an objection to evidence of a conversation h a d between plaintiff
and Frankovich a t the time t h e assignment
was made. The conversation related to the
consideration for the a s s i g n m e n t ; such consideration being medical services rendered
to Frankovich by the plaintiff, who is a physician. No question was m a d e as to the sufficiency of t h e consideration to support the
assignment, nor as to whether it was for
value. T h e evidence w a s therefore n o t competent. B u t it is a p p a r e n t t h a t the ruling
was not prejudicial. T h e appellants offered
no evidence, b u t rested their case entirely
upon their objection to the jurisdiction. Upon the evidence furnished by the writing
alone, t h e court w a s justified in directing a
verdict for plaintiff, as it did. The admission of. the incompetent evidence could not
have affected the judgment of the court in
this m a t t e r .
The verdict returned u n d e r the direction
of t h e court is as follows: "We, the jury in
the above-entitled action, find as our verdict t h a t t h e plaintiff A. E. Anderson is entitled to the sum of $94 heretofore paid into
court." I t is said t h a t t h e r e is no evidence
t h a t any sum had been paid into court, and
hence no evidence to support this verdict.
It is apparent, however, t h a t t h e parties and
the judge proceeded upon the assumption

(Okl.

t h a t the company had paid to the justice the
amount in controversy at the time it was dismissed from the case and was in the hands
of the clerk at the time of the trial. The
fact t h a t it had been paid to the justice is
recited in the answer of Paris Bros. In any
event, we must assume t h a t the fact t h a t it
had been paid to the clerk was known to the
court, or, if not actually known, was ascertained before it adjudged t h a t the sum belonged to the plaintiff. There is no merit in
this contention.
The judgment entered declares the plaintiff entitled to recover of P a r i s Bros, the
sum of $94 in the hands of the clerk, with
interest and costs. I t is not correct in
awarding any recovery a s against t h e appellants, except for costs. I t would be manifestly wrong that appellants should be compelled
to pay interest for the time during which the
sum in controversy was in the hands of the
clerk. The judgment should simply have
awarded the sum in dispute to the plaintiff,
and adjudged appellants to pay the costs.
The cause is remanded, with directions to
the district court to modify the judgment as
herein indicated. When so modified it will
stand affirmed; the respondent to recover
his costs.
Modified and affirmed.
HOLLOWAY and SMITH, J J . , concur.
(20 Okl. 1)

OKLAHOMA CITY v. OKLAHOMA RY. CO.
(Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Dae. 18, 1907.)
1. MANDAMUS
SERVICE.

—

PERFORMANCE

OF

PUBLIC

"When there is a grant and acceptance of
a public franchise which involves the performance of a certain service, the person or corporation accepting such franchise can by mandamus
be compelled to perform such service."
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig,
vol. 33, Mandamus, § 2GS.]
2. CARRIERS — CONTROL AND R E G U L A T I O N PREFERENCES AND DISCRIMINATIONS—PASSES— H A L F - F A R E T I C K E T S .

The provisions of section 13, art. 9, of the
Constitution, do not prohibit a municipal corporation operating a street railway from furnishing transportation free to its policemen and
firemen and United States mail carriers, and
half-rate tickets to school children, and fre€
transportation to children under a certain ag€
whilst traveling with a parent or guardian.
3.

SAME.

Municipalities are not prohibited by the provisions of section 13, art. 9, of the Constitution,
from granting franchises for street railways with
conditions coutained therein for the carrying of
policemen, firemen, United States mail carriers,
and children under a certain age free, and for
the furnishing of transportation to school children at a reduced fare, and when accepted by
the grantee in the franchise, are valid.
4.

OFFICERS—QUALIFICATION—OATH.

Policemen, firemen, and United States mail
carriers are not officers contemplated or included by section 1, art. 15, of the Constitution.
5. CARRIERS — CONTROL AND R E G U L A T I O N —
PREFERENCES AND R E G U L A T I O N S — H A L F FARE TICKETS.

Street railways undertaking and" contracting with municipalities by provisions contained

Old.)
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in franchises granted by such municipalities, to shall not exceed the sum of five cents for one
carry policemen, firemen, United States mail continuous passage over the said company's
carriers, and children under a certain age free, lines from points within the city limits to
<ind also to carry school children at half the
regular rate, are not absolved therefrom by sec- any other point in such city; such limit in
price shall not prevent the exaction of any
tion 13, art. 9, of the Constitution.
additional fare for return journeys, nor shall
(Syllabus by the Court.)
transfer slips be good for stop-over privileges.
Application by the city of Oklahoma City
Tickets for the use of school children shall
for writ of mandamus to the Oklahoma Rail- be furnished good for one continuous pasway Company. Writ granted.
sage, in quantities not less than twenty rides
The relator is a municipal corporation and at the rate of two and one half cents each,
a city of the first class under the laws of the under any reasonable regulation which the
state of Oklahoma, and has been since the company may impose to prevent the abuse of
1st day of January, A. D. 1902. On the 30th' such privilege or the use of such tickets by
clay of January, 1902, the mayor and council others than children under fifteen years of
of said city duly passed an ordinance author- age in actual attendance on the public schools
izing the Metropolitan Street Railway Com- of said city. United States mail carriers, popany, among other things, to build and con- licement, and members of the fire departstruct a system of electric street railways ment, while in the discharge of their duties
over and along the streets of said city, defin- shall be carried free." Said respondent has
ing the conditions of the exercise of the au- refused, and does refuse, to issue and furnish
thority therein conferred to construct such tickets for the use of school children for one
street railway system, and regulating the op- continuous passage in quantities of not less
eration and maintenance thereof, and impos- than 20 rides at the rate of 2% cents each,
ing certain contractual obligations on said and has further refused to carry United
company. Thereafter, on the 8th day of Feb- States mail carriers, policemen, and members
ruary, 1902, the Metropolitan Street Railway of the fire department when in the discharge
company, in accordance with the require- of their duties, and children under five years
ments of said ordinance, filed with the city of age when accompanied by parents or
clerk of said city its proper and written ac- guardians, free; but is collecting of and
ceptance of the terms and conditions thereof. from all children, mail carriers, policemen,
Thereafter during said year, the Metropoli- and members of the fire department, and
tan Street Railway Company constructed a such children under the age of five years the
system of railways in said city, and placed full authorized fare under the terms of said
the same in operation, and on the 15th day franchise, five cents for each passenger carof June, 1904, said railway company sold, ried, in violation of the terms of said franconveyed, and assigned its said railway sys- chise agreement. It is further alleged by
tem, together with the franchise rights and the plaintiff that the transportation of its poprivileges existing in its favor by virtue of licemen and firemen while in the discharge
said ordinance, to the Oklahoma Railway of their official duties by the said railway
Company, the respondent herein, and said re- company is a valuable undertaking in behalf
spondent, in order to procure the assent of of said city, and that, if the said provision
the mayor and councilmen of said city to is not enforced against said railway comsaid transfer, filed the said transfer with the pany, it will work great hardship in requirmayor and councilmen of said city, together ing it to pay a large amount of money for
with its written acceptance and assumption the passage of its policemen and firemen over
of all the duties and burdens imposed there- said railway while in the discharge of their
in. Thereafter, on the 27th day of June, several duties, to the great damage and in1004, an ordinance was duly passed ratify- jury of said city. Relator further alleges
ing and confirming said transfer to said re- and avers that said city has paid, and is payspondent, and authorized the extension and ing, said respondent to transport said persons
maintenance of said system, of street rail- and for said reduced fares as a part of the
ways on the streets and public thoroughfares rental or consideration of the use of the
of said city, said respondent thereby becom- streets for said street railway system, and
ing subrogated to all the powers and rights it was so understood and agreed that said
in said original ordinance of the Metropoli- railway company should render said service
tan Railway Company, and thereby became as a part of the consideration for the use of
said streets and the privileges granted under
Round to the performance of all the duties
said franchise, and that during the five years
therein imposed upon said railway company, the said street railway company had been
^•s a part of the consideration for the grant- operating in said city numerous schoolhouses
In
a of said privileges by virtue of said ordi- have been erected with reference to the line
nance and for the use of the streets and pub- and routes of said respondent's railway sysn
c thoroughfares in said city by said rail- tem to promote the convenience of children of
way company in the transportation of pas- school age attending schools of said city, and
Se
ngers from one point to another, it was that inhabitants thereof have built and loProvided in section 7 of said ordinance as fol- cated their homes and residences with refero\vs: "The charges for transporting passen- ence to such routes, and with reference to
?er
s to be exacted by said railway company
93P.—4
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the cheap and convenient line for their children to reach the schools of said city to
which they might be assigned, and that the
discontinuance of the sale of said school
tickets will work a great hardship to the
said relator and its inhabitants. The respondent voluntarily entered its appearance,
without the issuance of an alternative writ,
and confessed the facts stated in said petition, but alleged as a matter of law that the
relief demanded should be denied under the
provisions of section 13, art. 9, of the Constitution of the state of Oklahoma, and submitted this case under such issue of law.
T. G. Chambers and John Embry, U. S.
Atty., for relator. John W. Shartel, for respondent.
WILLIAMS, C. J. (after stating the facts as
above). "When there is a grant and acceptance of a public franchise which involves the
performance of a certain service, the person
or corporation accepting such franchise can
by mandamus be compelled to perform such
service." Merrill on Mandamus, § 21: Section 13 of article 9 of the Constitution of the
state of Oklahoma reads as follows: "No
railroad or transportation company, or transmission company shall, directly or indirectly,
issue or give any free frank or free ticket,
free pass* or other free transportation, for
any use, within this state, except to its employees and their families, its officers, agents,
surgeons, physicians, and attorneys at law;
to ministers of religion, traveling secretaries
for railroad Young Men's Christian Associations, inmates of hospitals and charitable and
eleemosynary institutions and persons exclusively engaged in charitable and eleemosynary work; to indigent, destitute and homeless persons, and to such persons when transported by charitable societies or hospitals,
and the necessary agents, employed in such
transportations; to inmates of the National
Homes, or State Homes for disabled Volunteer Soldiers, and of Soldiers' and Sailors'
Homes, including those about to enter and
those returning home after discharge, and
boards of managers of such Homes; to members of volunteer fire departments and their
equipage while traveling as such; to necessary care takers of live stock, poultry, and
fruit; to employees of sleeping cars, of express cars, and to linemen of telephone and
telegraph companies ; to railway mail service
employees, postoifice inspectors, custom inspectors, and immigration inspectors: to newsboys on trains, baggage agents, witnesses attending any legal investigation in which the
railroad company or transportation company
is interested, persons injured in wrecks, and
phj-sicians and nurses attending such persons : Provided, that this provision shall not
be construed to prohibit the interchange of
passes for the officers, agents and employees
of common carriers and their families; nor
to prohibit any common carrier from car-
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rying passengers free with the object of pro,
viding relief in cases of general epidemic,
pestilence, or other calamitous visitation;
nor to prevent them from transporting, free
of charge, to their places of employment persons entering their service, and the interchange of passes to that end; and any railroad, transportation, or transmission company or any person, other than the persons excepted in this provision, who grants or uses
any such free frank, free ticket, free pass,
or free transportation within this state, shall
be deemed guilty of a crime, and the Legislature shall provide proper penalties for the
violation of any provision of this section by
the railroad or transportation or transmission company, or by any individual: Provided, that nothing herein shall prevent tbe
Legislature from extending these provisions
so as to exclude such free transportations or
franks from other persons." The only question that is necessary to be determined in
this case is whether or not said section absolves the respondent from its obligation and
undertaking to the relator to furnish the
tickets to the school children under the terms
named, and to carry the policemen, firemen,
mail carriers, and certain children free, as
stipulated in said franchise. If it be determined that said section does not affect said
obligations and undertakings in said franchise, then the peremptory writ should issue.
Section 6 of article 18 of said Constitution
reads as follows: "Every municipal corporation within this state shall have the right
to engage in any business or enterprise which
majr be engaged in by a person, firm or corporation by virtue of a franchise from said
corporation." It could not be successfully
contended that, if the relator were directly
engaged in the business of operating said
street railway line, it could not carry said,
school children at the rates and under the
terms designated in said franchise, or its
policemen and firemen, the mail carriers, and
children under five years of age when accompanied by a parent or guardian, without
charge, on account of the provisions of section 13, art. 9, supra; for the term "railroad" or "transportation company" or "transmission company," as used in said section,
would not include the relator. Section 1 of
article 9 of the Constitution reads as follows:
"As used in this article the term 'corporation'
or 'company' shall include all associations
and joint stock companies having any power
or privileges, not possessed by individuals,
and exclude all municipal corporations and
public institutions owned or controlled by
the state." Now, if the relator, being authorized to operate a street railway system
in said city, would be permitted under the
provisions of this Constitution to furnish
tickets to the school children under the terms
and prices hereinbefore named, and to carry
its policemen and firemen, the mail carriers,
and certain children free, then, why would
not a contract entered into to that end by the
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relator be valid? The respondent herein is nearly three years before the Constitution
Trans- went into effect? 'No public officer or pern 0 t furnishing "free transportation."
-portation and reduced rates to a certain cla«s son elected or appointed to a public office
j« in this case furnished not by the respond- under the laws of this state shall directly or
ent This is done by the city, the relator indirectly ask, demand, accept, receive, or
herein, which it has a right to do under the consent to receive, for his own use or benefit
law. I11 K e Grimes v. Minneapolis, Lyndale * * * any free pass * * * from any
& Minnetonka Railway Company, 37 Minn. corporation, or make use of the same for him07, 33 N. W. 34, the court said: "Grimes and self or in conjunction with another.' Const,
wife conveyed to defendant certain land for art. 13, § 5. It will be observed that a pubthe purposes of its railway, and in considera- lic officer is forbidden to receive and use a
tion of the conveyance defendant agreed to 'free pass'; it being the obvious intention of
* car ry' said Grimes and wife, and any of the Constitution to prohibit the public officers
their children, 'free of charge,' in the pas- of the state from receiving from corporations
senger cars run upon its road. Plaintiff is privileges or favors, in other words gifts, that
one of the children mentioned. Held, that might improperly influence them in the disthe effect of defendant's agreement is to en- charge of their official duties. So, if this
title the plaintiff to be carried free of charge. constitutional provision applies to the plainThe fact that his father purchased and paid tiff as a public officer, it is due to the fact
for this right of free carriage is not impor- that he is accepting a 'free pass,' a gift from
tant. The plaintiffs right is as complete as the defendant. This court more than 30
if he had purchased and paid for it himself, years ago held that the holder of a pass who
and, as a logical consequence, its' infringe- had compensated the corporation therefor
ment, whether tortious or otherwise, is a could not be regarded in any just sense as a
wrong to him for which he has his action."
In re Erie & Pittsburg Railway Company v. Co., 24 N. X. 227." It "was the obvious inDouthet, SS Pa. 245. 32 Am. Rep. 45: "Thj dention of the Constitution, not only to proagreement of the defendants was to give,
hibit public officers of the state from receivplaintiff a pass over their railroad for
ing from corporations privileges or favors
self and his family for his lifetime as t]
that might improperly influence them in the
consideration of his release of the rightcof discharge of their official duties, but also
way over his land. The pass was given
that the general public should have equal
a while, and then refused, and this action facilities and conveniences of transportation'
was to recover damages for their breacry^f without discrimination in the charges therecontract." The court held in the above e&se for. Section 1 of article 15 of the Constituthat the plaintiff was entitled to recover.
tion reads as follows: "Senators and repreRe Curry v. Kansas & Colorado Pacific Com- sentatives, and all judicial, state and counpany, 5S Kan. 1S.-4S Pac. 5S3, the court sajj
ty officers, shall, before • entering' upon the
"The company cannot excuse itself uponnlie duties of their respective offices, take and
score of the interstate commerce act. Thj
subscribe to the following oath or affirmaact forbids the gratuitous issuance of (mil- tion: 'I,
, do solemnly swear (or affirm)
way passes, not their issuance for a moneyed that I will support, obey, and defend the Conor other valuable consideration. The tj
stitution of the United States, and the Conportation in question was paid for by a1
stitution of the state of Oklahoma, and will
veyance of land; and does, not, there!
discharge the duties of my office with fidelity ;
come within the prohibitive • terms of
that I have not paid, or contributed, either dilaw behind which the company endeavors'
rectly or indirectly, any money or other valushelter itself." In Re De'mpsey v. New York able thing, to procure mv nomination or elecCentral &. Hudson River Railway Company, tion (or appointment), except for necessary and
146 N. Y. 294, 40 N. E. SGS, the court said: proper expenses expressly authorized by law ;
"In considering this question, it must be con- that I have not knowingly violated any elecceded that, unless the contractual relations tion law of the state, or procured it to be
of the parties distinguished this case from done by others in my behalf; that I will not,,
that of the ordinary public officer, the issue knowingly, receive, directly or indirectly, any
of the annual pass would be illegal. This money or other valuable thing, for the percourt has very recently held, in the case of formance or non-performance of any act or
a notary public, that while it was not quite duty pertaining to my office, other than the
obvious that he was not in that class of pub- compensation allowed by law, and I further
lic officers who should be prohibited from ac- swear (or affirm) that I will not receive, use,
cepting privileges or favors from corpora- or travel upon any free pass or on free transtions, yet, as the language of the Constitution portation during my term of office.' " Police^"as plain and comprehensive the courts were men, firemen, and mail carriers are evidently
bound to strictly enforce its provisions. Peo- not officers contemplated by said section.
ple v. Rathbone, 145 X. Y. 434, 40 N. E. 305, Policemen and firemen are not required un2S
L. R. A. 3S4. What, then, are the pre- der the provisions of this Constitution to
cise provisions of the Constitution which arc take this form of an oath; and hence it
claimed to be violated by the strict perform- cannot be said that it was. or is now, against
ance of tills contract which was in force for public policy for the relator, the municipality,.
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to contract for t h e "free passage'' of its policemen and firemen and t h e mail carriers.
Nor is it against public policy for said relator to contract for a special r a t e for school
children whilst traveling to and from school;
for it is undoubtedly the policy of this state
to support and maintain public schools. And
so an undertaking for reduced f a r e to the
end t h a t the entire public may have t h e benefit of it for children whilst traveling to and
from school is not violative of the spirit or
the intention of section 13 of article 9 of the
Constitution. F u r t h e r , it is good policy for
the United States mail to be delivered free,
being approved not only by t h e federal, but
also by t h e local, government, a n d t h e relator
acting w i t h a view of promoting free delivery
did not contract against public policy, nor
does t h e Constitution either in letter or
spirit prohibit such u n d e r t a k i n g which would
neither reasonably tend to improperly influence such officers nor discriminate against
the public; for the preservation of the peace,
the attendance of children upon t h e public
schools, and the free delivery of t h e United
States mails a r e all conducive t o the public
welfare. The reduced t r a n s p o r t a t i o n for the
children and the free t r a n s p o r t a t i o n for the
policemen and firemen, t h e children of certain age, and mail carriers does not come
from the respondent railway company, but
from t h e city. I t is the result of t h e city's
act j u s t as much so as if it had by bonded
undertaking raised the money a n d paid a
moneyed consideration to the respondent corporation, a s a result of. which said corporation had undertaken and- bound itself to carry t h e school children under the t e r m s named
in' t h a t franchise, and to carry t h e policemen,
firemen, mail carriers, and certain children
of a designated age free of charge; for the
franchise w a s an undertaking g r a n t i n g privileges of great value.
We a r e of t h e opinion t h a t t h i s contract
which existed between Oklahoma City, t h e
relator herein, and the Oklahoma Railway
Company, t h e respondent herein, w a s not
only a valid contract prior to t h e adoption of
this Constitution, but is also n o w a valid contract, and not in conflict w i t h section 13 of
article 9 of said Constitution, a n d t h a t the
former is entitled to t h e relief prayed for.
Let the peremptory w r i t of m a n d a m u s issue.

(Utah

der the laws of a certain state is incompetent'
this not being proof by reputation.
'
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Bi?
vol. 12, Corporations, § 110.]
2. FORGERY— UTTERING FORGED INSTRUMENTSINFORMATION—MATERIAL ALLEGATION.

The allegation that the company was a corporation, in an information charging that defendant knowing the instrument to be forged,
and with intent to damage a certain company, a
corporation organized under certain laws, "uttered and passed as true to a bank a writing
purporting to be a check, is a material allegation.
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. D>.
voi. 23, Forgery, § 86.]
3. W O R D S AND P H R A S E S — " R E P U T A T I O N . "

''Reputation'' is what is generally said of
a person by the people of the community where
he is known.
[Ed. Note.—For other definitions, see Words
and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 6118-6120.]
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake
County; Geo. C. Armstrong, Judge.
Arthur Brown appeals from a conviction.
Reversed, and new trial granted.
Powers & Marioneaux, for appellant. M.
A. Breeden, Atty. Gen., and F . C. Loofbourow, Dist. Atty., for the State.

McCARTY, C. J. The defendant was
tried a n d convicted for the crime of forgery.
The information, so far as material here,
alleges: " T h a t the said A r t h u r Brown, at
the county of Salt Lake, in the state of
Utah, on the 21st day of May, A. D 1906,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully,
feloniously, and knowing the same to be
false, forged and counterfeited, and with intent to prejudice, damage, and defraud the
Utah Apex Mining Company, a corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws
of the state of Maine, utter, publish, and pass
as true and genuine to and upon the Commercial National Bank a certain false and counterfeited writing or paper purporting to be a
check, commonly called a 'bank check,' the
tenor whereof is as follows [then follows the
description of t h e check]." To prove the ex-'
istence of the corporation mentioned in the
information the district attorney, over the objections made by defendant, w a s permitted
to ask W. C. Orein, a witness for-the state,
and the witness was allowed to answer the
following questions: "Q. Mr. Orern, what, if
any, mining companies a r e you interested
in? A. The Utah Apex Mining Company
TURNER, KANE, DUNN, a n d HAYES, * * * and others. Q. I will ask you what
J J . , concur.
sort of a company the U t a h Apex Mining Company is? A. I t is a corporation organized
under t h e laws of Maine. Q. I wjill ask you
(33 Utah, 109)
what, if any, business t h a t corporation carSTATE v. BROWN.
ries on within this state? A. T h e business
(Supreme Court of Utah. Dec. 17, 1907.)
of mining." Other questions w e r e asked by
t h e district attorney, and answered by the
1. CORPORATIONS — P R O O F OF CORPORATE E X ISTENCE.
witness, in which the corporate existence
Under Rev. St. 189S, § 4859, providing that of the company was assumed, but no testiin a criminal case the existence of a corporation need not be shown by the articles or act mony such as the s t a t u t e requires to prove
of incorporation, but may be proved by'general corporate existence in cases of this kind was
reputation or by the statutes of the state by offered a t the trial. I n fact, t h e only testiwhich the corporation was created, testimony
that a company was a corporation organized mi- J mony in the record t h a t tends in any degree
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when he declined to recant, and later was elected again, in the
regular 1966 primary and general elections. Held:

APPEAL FROM T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR T H E
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA.

1. This Court has jurisdiction to determine whether a disqualification for the office of state legislator under color of a proper
constitutional standard violates First Amendment rights. P. 131.

No. 87. Argued November 10, 1966.—Decided December 5, 1966.
Several months after the election in June 1965 to the Georgia House
of Representatives of appellant Bond, a Negro, a civil rights
organization of which he was a staff member issued an anti-war
statement against the Government's Vietnam policy and the
operation of the Selective Service laws. Bond endorsed the statement in a news interview stating among other things that as "a
second class citizen" he was not required to support the war, as
a pacifist he was opposed to all war, and he saw nothing inconsistent with his statement and his taking the oath of office. House
members in petitions challenged Bond's right to be seated, charging that his statements aided our enemies, violated the Selective
Service laws, discredited the House, and were inconsistent with
the legislator's mandatory oath to support the Constitution. Following the House clerk's refusal to seat him, Bond, manifesting
willingness to take the oath, challenged the petitions as depriving
him of his First Amendment rights and being racially motivated.
At a House committee hearing Bond amplified his views and
denied having urged draft card burning or other law violations.
Following the hearing, the committee concluded that Bond should
not be seated and the House thereafter refused to seat him. Bond
brought this action in District Court for injunctive relief and a
declaratory judgment. The District Court, holding that it had
jurisdiction to decide the constitutional issue, concluded that Bond
had been accorded procedural due process through the hearing.
It also held that the House had a rational basis for concluding that
Bond's remarks exceeded criticism of national policy and that he
could not in good faith take an oath to support the State and
Federal Constitutions and thus could not meet a qualification for
membership which the House had the power to impose. While
Bond's appeal to this Court under 28 U . ' S . C. § 1253 from that
decision was pending he was again elected as a Representative, in
a special election. He was rejected by the House Rules Committee

2. In disqualifying Bond because of his statements the State
violated the First Amendment made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth. Pp. 131-137.
(a) A majority of state legislators is not authorized to test
the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator meets the
requirement for holding office of swearing to support the Federal
and State Constitutions. P. 132.
(b) The State may not apply to a legislator a First Amendment standard stricter than that applicable to a private citizen.
Pp. 132-133.
(c) Bond's statements do not show an incitement to violate
the Selective Service statute's prohibition of counselling against
registration for military service. Pp. 133-134.
(d) Though a State may impose an oath requirement on legislators it cannot limit their capacity to express views on local or
national policy. "[DJebate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open." New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U. S.
254, 270. Pp. 135-136.
251 F. Supp. 333, reversed.

Howard Moore, Jr., and Leonard B. Boudin argued the
cause for appellants. With them on the briefs was
Victor Rabinowitz.
Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia,
argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief
were William L. Harper and Alfred L. Evans, Jr., Assistant Attorneys General, and Paul L. Homes, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General.
Briefs of amid curiae, urging reversal, were filed by
Robert L. Carter for the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People; Melvin L. Wulj and
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Charles Morgan, Jr., for the American Civil Liberties
Union et al.; and by Joseph B. Robison for the American
Jewish Congress.
M R . C H I E F JUSTICE WARREN

delivered the opinion of

the Court.
The question presented in this case is whether the
Georgia House of Representatives may constitutionally
exclude appellant Bond, a duly elected Representative,
from membership because of his statements, and statements to which he subscribed, criticizing the policy of
the Federal Government in Vietnam and the operation
of the Selective Service laws. An understanding of the
circumstances of the litigation requires a complete presentation of the events and statements which led to this
appeal.
Bond, a Negro, was elected on June 15, 1965, as the
Representative to the Georgia House of Representatives
from the 136th House District. Of the District's 6,500
voters, approximately 6,000 are Negroes. Bond defeated
his opponent, Malcolm Dean, Dean of Men at Atlanta
University, also a Negro, by a vote of 2,320 to 487.
On January 6, 1966, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, a civil rights organization of which
Bond was then the Communications Director, issued the
following statement on American policy in Vietnam and
its relation to the work of civil rights organizations in
this country:
"The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee has a right and a responsibility to dissent with
United States foreign policy on an issue when it
sees fit. The Student Nonviolent Coordinating
Committee now states its opposition to United
States' involvement in Viet Nam on these grounds:
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"We believe the United States government has
been deceptive in its claims of concern for freedom
of the Vietnamese people, just as the government
has been deceptive in claiming concern for the
freedom of colored people in such other countries
as the Dominican Republic, the Congo, South Africa,
Rhodesia and in the United States itself.
"We, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, have been involved in the black people's
struggle for liberation and self-determination in this
country for the past five years. Our work, particularly in the South, has taught us that the United
States government has never guaranteed the freedom of oppressed citizens, and is not yet truly determined to end the rule of terror and oppression within
its own borders.
"We ourselves have often been victims of violence
and confinement executed by United States government officials. We recall the numerous persons who
have been murdered in the South because of their
efforts to secure their civil and human rights, and
whose murderers have been allowed to escape penalty for their crimes.
"The murder of Samuel Young in Tuskegee, Ala.,
is no different than the murder of peasants in Viet
Nam, for both Young and the Vietnamese sought,
and are seeking, to secure the rights guaranteed
them by law. In each case the United States government bears a great part of the responsibility for
these deaths.
"Samuel Young was murdered because United
States law is not being enforced. Vietnamese are
murdered because the United States is pursuing an
aggressive policy in violation of international law.
The United States is no respecter of persons or law
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when such persons or laws run counter to its needs
and desires.
"We recall the indifference, suspicion and outright
hostility with which our reports of violence have
been met in the past by government officials.
"We know that for the most part, elections in
this country, in the North as well as the South, are
not free. We have seen that the 1965 Voting Rights
Act and the 1964 Civil Rights Act have not yet
been implemented with full federal power and
sincerity.
"We question, then, the ability and even the desire of the United States government to guarantee
free elections abroad. We maintain that our country's cry of 'preserve freedom in the world' is a
hypocritical mask behind which it squashes liberation movements which are not bound, and refuse
to be bound, by the expediencies of United States
cold war policies.
"We are in sympathy with, and support, the men
in this country who are unwilling to respond to a
military draft which would compel them to contribute their lives to United States aggression in
Viet Nam in the name of the 'freedom' we find so
false in this country.
"We recoil with horror at the inconsistency of
a supposedly 'free' society where responsibility to
freedom is equated with the responsibility to lend
oneself to military aggression. We take note of the
fact that 16 per cent of the draftees from this country are Negroes called on to stifle the liberation of
Viet Nam, to preserve a 'democracy' which does not
exist for them at home.
"We ask, where is the draft for the freedom fight
in the United States?
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"We therefore encourage those Americans who
prefer to use their energy in building democratic
forms within this country. We believe that work
in the civil rights movement and with other human
relations organizations is a valid alternative to the
draft. We urge all Americans to seek this alternative, knowing full well that it may cost their lives—
as painfully as in Viet Nam."
On the same day that this statement was issued, Bond
was interviewed by telephone by a reporter from a local
radio station, and, although Bond had not participated
in drafting the statement, he endorsed the statement in
these words:
"Why, I endorse it, first, because I like to think
of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes that
war and any other war and eager and anxious to
encourage people not to participate in it for any
reason that they choose; and secondly, I agree with
this statement because of the reason set forth in it—
because I think it is sorta hypocritical for us to
maintain that we are fighting for liberty in other
places and we are not guaranteeing liberty to citizens
inside the continental United States.
"Well, I think that the fact that the United States
Government fights a war in Viet Nam, I don't think
that I as a second class citizen of the United States
have a requirement to support that war. I think
my responsibility is to oppose things that I think
are wrong if they are in Viet Nam or New York, or
Chicago, or Atlanta, or wherever."
When the interviewer suggested that our involvement
in Vietnam was because "if we do not stop Communism
233-653 O - 67 - 15
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there that it is just a question of where will we stop it
next," Bond replied:
"Oh, no, I'm not taking a stand against stopping
World Communism, and I'm not taking a stand in
favor of the Viet Cong. What I'm saying that is,
first, that I don't believe in that war. That particular war. I'm against all war. I'm against that
war in particular, and I don't think people ought to
participate in it. Because I'm against war, I'm
against the draft. I think that other countries in
the World get along without a draft—England is
one—and I don't see why we couldn't, too.
". . . I'm not about to justify that war, because
it's stopping International Communism, or whatever—you know, I just happen to have a basic
disagreement with wars for whatever reason they
are fought— . . . [F] ought to stop International
Communism, to promote International Communism,
or for whatever reason. I oppose the Viet Cong
fighting in Viet Nam as much as I oppose the United
States fighting in Viet Nam. I happen to live in the
United States. If I lived in North Viet Nam I
might not have the same sort of freedom of expression, but it happens that I live here—not there."
The interviewer also asked Bond if he felt he could
take the oath of office required by the Georgia Constitution, and Bond responded that he saw nothing inconsistent between his statements and the oath. Bond was
also asked whether he would adhere to his statements if
war were declared on North Vietnam and if his statements might become treasonous. He replied that he did
not know "if I'm strong enough to place myself in a
position where I'd be guilty of treason."
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Before January 10, 1966, when the Georgia House of
Representatives was scheduled to convene, petitions challenging Bond's right to be seated were filed by 75 House
members. These petitions charged that Bond's statements gave aid and comfort to the enemies of the United
States and Georgia, violated the Selective Service laws,
and tended to bring discredit and disrespect on the House.
The petitions further contended that Bond's endorsement
of the SNCC statement "is totally and completely repugnant to and inconsistent with the mandatory oath prescribed by the Constitution of Georgia for a Member of
the House of Representatives to take before taking his
seat." For the same reasons, the petitions asserted that
Bond could not take an oath to support the Constitution
of the United States. When Bond appeared at the
House on January 10 to be sworn in, the clerk refused
to administer the oath to him until the issues raised in
the challenge petitions had been decided.
Bond filed a response to the challenge petitions in which
he stated his willingness to take the oath and argued
that he was not unable to do so in good faith. He further
argued that the challenge against his seating had been
filed to deprive him of his First Amendment rights, and
that the challenge was racially motivated. A special
committee was appointed to report on the challenge, and
a hearing was held to determine exactly what Bond had
said and the intentions with which he had said it.
At this hearing, the only testimony given against Bond
was that which he himself gave the committee. Both, the
opponents Bond had defeated in becoming the Representative of the 136th District testified to his good character and to his loyalty to the United States. A recording of the interview which Bond had given to the reporter
after the SNCC statement was played, and Bond was
called to the stand for cross-examination. He there admitted his statements and elaborated his views. He
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stated that he concurred in the SNCC statement "without
reservation," and, when asked if he admired the courage
of persons who burn their draft cards, responded:
"I admire people who take an action, and I admire
people who feel strongly enough about their convictions to take an action like that knowing the
consequences that they will face, and that was my
original statement when asked that question.
"I have never suggested or counseled or advocated
that any one other person burn their draft card.
In fact, I have mine in my pocket and will produce
it if you wish. I do not advocate that people should
break laws. What I simply try to say was that I
admired the courage of someone who could act on
his convictions knowing that he faces pretty stiff
consequences."
Tapes of an interview Bond had given the press after
the clerk had refused to give him the oath were also
heard by the special committee. In this interview, Bond
stated :
"I stand before you today charged with entering
into public discussion on matters of National interest. I hesitate to offer explanations for my actions or deeds where no charge has been levied
against me other than the charge that I have chosen
to speak my mind and no explanation is called for,
for no member of this House, has ever, to my knowledge, been called upon to explain his public statements for public postures as a prerequisite to
admission to that Body. I therefore, offer to my
constituents a statement of my views. I have not
counselled burning draft cards, nor have I burned
mine. I have suggested that congressionally outlined alternatives to military service be extended to
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building democracy at home. The posture of my
life for the past five years has been calculated to
give Negroes the ability to participate in formulation
of public policies. The fact of my election to public
office does not lessen my duty or desire to express
my opinions even when they differ from those held
by others. As to the current controversy because
of convictions that I have arrived at through examination of my conscience I have decided I personally
cannot participate in war.
"I stand here with intentions to take an oath—
that oath they just took in there—that will dispel
any doubts about my convictions or loyalty."
The special committee gave general approval in its report to the specific charges in the challenge petitions that
Bond's endorsement of the SNCC statement and his
supplementary remarks showed that he "does not and
will not" support the Constitutions of the United States
and of Georgia, that he "adheres to the enemies of
the . . . State of Georgia" contrary to the State Constitution, that he gives aid and comfort to the enemies of
the United States, that his statements violated the Universal Military Training and Service Act, § 12, 62 Stat.
622, 50 U. S. C. App. § 462, and that his statements "are
reprehensible and are such as tend to bring discredit to
and disrespect of the House." On the same day the
House adopted the committee report without findings
and without further elaborating Bond's lack of qualifications, and resolved by a vote of 184 to 12 that "Bond
shall not be allowed to take the oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives and that Representative-Elect Julian Bond shall not be seated as a
member of the House of Representatives."
Bond then instituted an action in the District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia for injunctive re-
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lief and a declaratory judgment that the House action
was unauthorized by the Georgia Constitution and violated Bond's rights under the First Amendment. A
three-judge District Court was convened under 28
U. S. C. §2281. All three members of the District
Court held that the court had jurisdiction to decide the
constitutionality of the House action because Bond had
asserted substantial First Amendment rights. 1 On the
merits, however, the court was divided.
Judges Bell and Morgan, writing for the majority of
the court, addressed themselves first to the question of
whether the Georgia House had power under state law
to disqualify Bond based on its conclusion that he could
not sincerely take the oath of office. They reasoned that
separation-of-powers principles gave the Legislature
power to insist on qualifications in addition to those
specified in the State Constitution.
The majority
pointed out that nothing in the Georgia Constitution
limits the qualifications of the legislators to those
expressed in the constitution.
Having concluded that the action of the Georgia
House was authorized by state law, the court considered
whether Bond's disqualification violated his constitutional right of freedom of speech. It reasoned that the
decisions of this Court involving particular state political offices supported an attitude of restraint in which
the principles of separation of powers and federalism
should be balanced against the alleged deprivation of
individual constitutional rights. On this basis, the majority below fashioned the test to be applied in this case
as being whether the refusal to seat Bond violated procedural or what it termed substantive due process. The
court held that the hearing which had been given Bond
by the House satisfied procedural due process. As for
^ x The opinion of the District Court is reported at 251 F. Supp.
^333 (1966).
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what it termed the question of substantive due process,
the majority concluded that there was a rational evidentiary basis for the ruling of the House. It reasoned that
Bond's right to dissent as a private citizen was limited
by his decision to seek membership in the Georgia House.
Moreover, the majority concluded, the SNCC statement
and Bond's related remarks went beyond criticism of
national policy and provided a rational basis for a conclusion that the speaker could not in good faith take an
oath to support the State and Federal Constitutions:
"A citizen would not violate his oath by objecting
to or criticizing this policy or even by calling it
deceptive and false as the statement did.
"But the statement does not stop with this. It
is a call to action based on race; a call alien to the
concept of the pluralistic society which makes this
nation. It aligns the organization with '. . . colored
people in such other countries as the Dominican
Republic, the Congo, South Africa, Rhodesia . . . /
It refers to its involvement in the black people's
struggle for liberation and self-determination . . . /
It states that 'Vietnamese are murdered because the
United States is pursuing an aggressive policy in
violation of international law.' I t alleges that
Negroes, referring to American servicemen, are
called on to stifle the liberation of Viet Nam.
"The call to action, and this is what we find to
be a rational basis for the decision which denied
Mr. Bond his seat, is that language which states
that SNCC supports those men in this country who
are unwilling to respond to a military draft." 2
Chief Judge Tuttle dissented.3 He reasoned that the
question of the power of the Georgia House under the
2

Id., at 344.
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State Constitution to disqualify a Representative under
these circumstances had never been decided by the state
courts, and that federal courts should construe state law,
if possible, so as to avoid unnecessary federal constitutional issues. Since Bond satisfied all the stated qualifications in the State Constitution, Chief Judge Tuttle
concluded that his disqualification was beyond the power
of the House as a matter of state constitutional law.
Bond appealed directly to this Court from the decision of the District Court under 28 U. S. C. § 1253.
While this appeal was pending, the Governor of Georgia
called a special election to fill the vacancy caused by
Bond's exclusion. Bond entered this election and won
overwhelmingly. The House was in recess, but the Rules
Committee held a hearing in which Bond declined to recant his earlier statements. Consequently, he was again
prevented from taking the oath of office, and the seat
has remained vacant. Bond again sought the seat from
the 136th District in the regular 1966 election, and he
won the Democratic primary in September 1966, and
won an overwhelming majority in the election of November 8, 1966.4
The Georgia Constitution sets out a number of specific
provisions dealing with the qualifications and eligibility
of state legislators. These provide that Representatives
shall be citizens of the United States, at least 21 years
of age, citizens of Georgia for two years, and residents
for one year of the counties from which elected.5 The

116

Opinion of the Court.

Georgia Constitution further provides that no one convicted of treason against the State, or of any crime of
moral turpitude, or of a number of other enumerated
crimes may hold any office in the State. 6 Idiots and
insane persons are barred from office,7 and no one holding any state or federal office is eligible for a seat in
either house.8 The State Constitution also provides:
"Election, returns, etc.; disorderly conduct.—
Each House shall be the judge of the election,
returns, and qualifications of its members and shall
have power to punish them for disorderly behavior,
or misconduct, by censure, fine, imprisonment, or
expulsion; but no member shall be expelled, except
by a vote of two-thirds of the House to which he
belongs." 9
These constitute the only stated qualifications for membership in the Georgia Legislature and the State concedes
that Bond meets all of them. The Georgia Constitution
also requires Representatives to take an oath stated in
the Constitution:
"Oath of members.—Each senator and Representative, before taking his seat, shall take the
following oath, or affirmation, to-wit: 'I will support
the Constitution of this State and of the United
States, and on all questions and measures which may
come before me, I will so conduct myself, as will, in
my judgment, be most conducive to the interests and
prosperity of this State/ " 10

4

A question was raised in oral argument as to whether this case
might not be moot since the session of the House which excluded
Bond was no longer in existence. The State has not pressed this
argument, and it could not do so, because the State has stipulated
that if Bond succeeds on this appeal he will receive back salary
for the term from which he was excluded.
V> Georgia Const,, Art. 3, § 6 (§2-1801, Ga. Code Ann.),
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6

Georgia Const., Art, 2, § 2 (§2-801, Ga. Code Ann.).
Ibid.
8
Georgia Const., Art, 3, § 4 (§2-1606, Ga. Code Ann.).
9
Georgia Const., Art. 3, § 7 (§2-1901, Ga. Code Ann.).
10
Georgia Const., Art. 3, §4 (§2-1605, Ga. Code Ann.).
7
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The State points out in its brief that the latter part of
this oath, involving the admonition to act in the best
interests of the State, was not the standard by which
Bond was judged.
The State does not claim that Bond refused to take
the oath to support the Federal Constitution, a requirement imposed on state legislators by Art. VI, cl. 3, of
the United States Constitution:
"The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both
of the United States and of the several States, shall
be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Tests shall ever be
required as a Qualification to any Office or public
Trust under the United States."
Instead, it argues that the oath provisions of the State
and Federal Constitutions constitute an additional qualification. Because under state law the legislature has
exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an elected
Representative meets the enumerated qualifications, it
is argued that the legislature has power to look beyond
the plain meaning of the oath provisions which merely
require that the oaths be taken. This additional power
is said to extend to determining whether a given Representative may take the oath with sincerity. The State
does not claim that it should be completely free of judicial review whenever it disqualifies an elected Representative ; it admits that, if a State Legislature excluded
a legislator on racial or other clearly unconstitutional
grounds, the federal (or state) judiciary would be justi-.
fied in testing the exclusion by federal constitutional
standards. 11 But the State argues that there can be no
11

See Gomillion v. Lightjoot, 364 U. S. 339 (1960), in which the
C$urt stated: "When a State exercises power wholly within the
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doubt as to the constitutionality of the qualification
involved in this case because it is one imposed on the
State Legislatures by Article VI of the United States
Constitution. Moreover, the State contends that no decision of this Court suggests that a State may not ensure
the loyalty of its public servants by making the taking
of an oath a qualification of office. Thus the State
argues that there should be no judicial review of the
legislature's power to judge whether a prospective member may conscientiously take the oath required by the
State and Federal Constitutions.
We are not persuaded by the State's attempt to distinguish, for purposes of our jurisdiction, between an
exclusion alleged to be on racial grounds and one alleged
to violate the First Amendment. The basis for the
argued distinction is that, in this case, Bond's disqualification was grounded on a constitutional standard—the
requirement of taking an oath to support the Constitution. But Bond's contention is that this standard was
utilized to infringe his First Amendment rights, and we
cannot distinguish, for purposes of our assumption of
jurisdiction, between a disqualification under an unconstitutional standard and a disqualification which, although under color of a proper standard, is alleged to
violate the First Amendment.
We conclude as did the entire court below that this
Court has jurisdiction to review the question of whether
the action of the Georgia House of Representatives deprived Bond of federal constitutional rights, and we now
move to the central question posed in the case—whether
Bond's disqualification because of his statements violated
domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review.
But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used
as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right."
364 U. S., at 347.
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the free speech provisions of the First Amendment as
applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.
The State argues that the exclusion does not violate
the First Amendment because the State has a right,
under Article VI of the United States Constitution, to
insist on loyalty to the Constitution as a condition of
office. A legislator of course can be required to swear
to support the Constitution of the United States as a
condition of holding office, but that is not the issue in
this case, as the record is uncontradicted that Bond has
repeatedly expressed his willingness to swear to the oaths
provided for in the State and Federal Constitutions.
Nor is this a case where a legislator swears to an oath
pro forma while declaring or manifesting his disagreement with or indifference to the oath. Thus, we do not
quarrel with the State's contention that the oath provisions of the United States and Georgia Constitutions do
not violate the First Amendment. But this requirement
does not authorize a majority of state legislators to test
the sincerity with which another duly elected legislator
can swear to uphold the Constitution. Such a power
could be utilized to restrict the right of legislators to
dissent from national or state policy or that of a majority
of their colleagues under the guise of judging their loyalty to the Constitution. Certainly there can be no question but that the First Amendment protects expressions
in opposition to national foreign policy in Vietnam and
to the Selective Service system. The State does not
contend otherwise. But it argues that Bond went beyond expressions of opposition, and counseled violations
of the Selective Service laws, and that advocating violation of federal law demonstrates a lack of support for
the Constitution. The State declines to argue that
Bond's statements would violate any law if made by a
private citizen, but it does argue that even though such
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a citizen might be protected by his First Amendment
rights, the State may nonetheless apply a stricter standard to its legislators. We do not agree.
Bond could not have been constitutionally convicted
under 50 U. S. C. App. §462 (a), which punishes any
person who "counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or
evade registration/' 12 Bond's statements were at worst
unclear on the question of the means to be adopted to
avoid the draft. While the SNCC statement said "We
are in sympathy with, and support, the men in this
country who are unwilling to respond to a military draft/'
this statement alone cannot be interpreted as a call to
unlawful refusal to be drafted. Moreover, Bond's supplementary statements tend to resolve the opaqueness in
favor of legal alternatives to the draft, and there is no
evidence to the contrary. On the day the statement was
issued, Bond explained that he endorsed it "because I
like to think of myself as a pacifist and one who opposes
that war and any other war and eager and anxious to
12

The pertinent provisions of §462 (a) are as follows:
"[A]ny person who shall knowingly make, or be a party to the
making, of any false statement or certificate regarding or bearing
upon a classification or in support of any request for a particular
classification, for service under the provisions of this title . . . , or
rules, regulations, or directions made pursuant thereto, or who otherwise evades or refuses registration or service in the armed forces
or any of the requirements of this title . . . , or who knowingly
counsels, aids, or abets another to refuse or evade registration or
service in the armed forces or any of the requirements of this
title . . . , or of said rules, regulations, or directions, . . . or any
person or persons who shall knowingly hinder or interfere or attempt
to do so in any way, by force or violence or otherwise, with the
administration of this title . . . or the rules or regulations made
pursuant thereto, or who conspires to commit any one or more of
such offenses, shall, upon conviction in any district court of the
United States of competent jurisdiction, be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of not more than $10,000,
or by both such fine and imprisonment . . . ."
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encourage people not to participate in it for any reason
that they choose." In the same interview, Bond stated
categorically that he did not oppose the Vietnam policy
because he favored the Communists; that he was a loyal
American citizen and supported the Constitution of the
United States. He further stated "I oppose the Viet
Cong fighting in Viet Nam as much as I oppose the
United States fighting in Viet Nam." At the hearing
before the Special Committee of the Georgia House,
when asked his position on persons who burned their
draft cards, Bond replied that he admired the courage
of persons who "feel strongly enough about their convictions to take an action like that knowing the consequences that they will face." When pressed as to
whether his admiration was based on the violation of
federal law, Bond stated:
"I have never suggested or counseled or advocated
that any one other person burn their draft card. In
fact, I have mine in my pocket and will produce it
if you wish. I do not advocate that people should
break laws. What I simply try to say was that I
admired the courage of someone who could act on
his convictions knowing that he faces pretty stiff
consequences."
Certainly this clarification does not demonstrate any
incitement to violation of law. No useful purpose would
be served by discussing the many decisions of this Court
which establish that Bond could not have been convicted
for these statements consistently with the First Amendment. See, e. g., Wood v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375 (1962);
Yates v. United States, 354 U. S. 298 (1957); Terminiello
v. Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949). Nor does the fact that
the District Court found the SNCC statement to have
racial overtones constitute a reason for holding it out-
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side the protection of the First Amendment. In fact
the State concedes that there is no issue of race in the
case.
The State attempts to circumvent the protection the
First Amendment would afford to these statements if
made by a private citizen by arguing that a State is
constitutionally justified in exacting a higher standard
of loyalty from its legislators than from its citizens. Of
course, a State may constitutionally require an oath to
support the Constitution from its legislators which it
does not require of its private citizens. But this difference in treatment does not support the exclusion of
Bond, for while the State has an interest in requiring
its legislators to swear to a belief in constitutional processes of government, surely the oath gives it no interest
in limiting its legislators' capacity to discuss their views
of local or national policy.13 The manifest function of
13

Madison and Hamilton anticipated the oppressive effect on
freedom of expression which would result if the legislature could
utilize its power of judging qualifications to pass judgment on a
legislator's political views. At the Constitutional Convention of
1787, Madison opposed a proposal to give to Congress power to
establish qualifications in general. Warren, The Making of the
Constitution 420-422 (1937). The Journal of the Federal Convention of 1787 states:
"Mr. Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper
& dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of
electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt,
and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could
regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. . . . Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be
devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker
faction.
"Mr. Madison observed that the British Parliamt. possessed the
power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the
elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy
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the First Amendment in a representative government
requires that legislators be given the widest latitude to
express their views on issues of policy. The central commitment of the First Amendment, as summarized in the
opinion of the Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U. S. 254, 270 (1964), is that "debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
We think the rationale of the New York Times case disposes of the claim that Bond's statements fell outside the
range of constitutional protection. Just as erroneous
statements must be protected to give freedom of expression the breathing space it needs to survive, so statements
criticizing public policy and the implementation of it
must be similarly protected. The State argues that the
New York Times principle should not be extended to
statements by a legislator because the policy of encouraging free debate about governmental operations only
applies to the citizen-critic of his government. We find
no support for this distinction in the New York Times
case or in any other decision of this Court. The interest
of the public in hearing all sides of a public issue is
hardly advanced by extending more protection to citizencritics than to legislators. Legislators have an obligation to take positions on controversial political questions
so that their constituents can be fully informed by them,
and be better able to assess their qualifications for office ;
also so they may be represented in governmental debates
of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious
parties." 2 Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787, pp. 249-250 (Aug. 10, 1787).
Hamilton agreed with Madison that:
"The qualifications of the persons who may choose or be
chosen . . . are defined and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by the legislature." The Federalist, No. 60, p. 409 (Cooke
ed 1961).
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by the person they have elected to represent them. We
therefore hold that the disqualification of Bond from
membership in the Georgia House because of his statements violated Bond's right of free expression under the
First Amendment. Because of our disposition of the
case on First Amendment grounds, we need not decide
the other issues advanced by Bond and the amici.1*
The judgment of the District Court is
Reversed.

14

Bond argues that the action of the Georgia House was not
authorized by state law, that if the State Constitution allows this
exclusion it does so pursuant to an oath which is unconstitutionally
vague, that the exclusion was based on statements protected by the
First Amendment, and that the exclusion is a bill of attainder and
an ex post facto law. In addition, amicus briefs filed in support of
appellant Bond add the arguments that the decision not to seat him
was inextricably involved with race prejudice and that it violated
the guarantee of a republican form of government clause.
Similarly, we need not pass on the standing of two of Bond'b
constituents who joined in the suit below. The majority below
dismissed the complaint as to these two constituents because they
lacked a sufficiently direct interest in the controversy as would give
them standing. The majority noted that it was appropriate to
dismiss the case as to Bond's constituents because Bond's complaint
would resolve every issue necessary to a decision in the case. We
express no opinion on the question of whether Bond's constituents
can claim that concrete adverseness which would be necessary to
give them standing.

